


# United States Fire Administration



## Technical Report Series

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### **Nine Elderly Fire Victims in Residential Hotel Miami Beach, Florida**



**Federal Emergency Management Agency**

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**United States Fire Administration  
National Fire Data Center**

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## **United States Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program**

The United States Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant "lessons learned." In some cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire - the effect of building construction or contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough to highlight once again. with yet another fire tragedy report.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at national and regional fire meetings. The International Association of Fire Chiefs assists USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building technology, and other related areas

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities to insure that USFA's assistance and presence would be supportive and would in no way interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. focal authorities review USFA's report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, Arlington, Vii its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the Fire Administration in carrying out the Fire Reports Program.

The United States Fire Administration greatly appreciates the cooperation received from the Miami Beach Fire Department. Particular thanks go to Fire Chief Braniard Dorris.

For additional copies of this report write to the United States Fire Administration, National Fire Data Center, 16825 South Seton Avenue, Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727.

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# **Nine Elderly Fire Victims in Residential Hotel Miami, Florida (April 6, 1990)**

**Investigated by: Charles Jennings**

**This is Report 041 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted  
by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-90-C-3338 to the United  
States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.**



**Federal Emergency Management Agency**



**United States Fire Administration  
National Fire Data Center**

## **Nine Elderly Fire Victims in Residential Hotel Miami Beach, Florida**

**Investigated by:** Charles Jennings

**Local Contacts:** Braniard Dorris, Chief  
Miami Beach Fire Department  
2300 Pine Tree Drive  
Miami Beach, Florida 33140

### **OVERVIEW**

Early in the morning of April 6, 1990, a fire in a Miami Beach hotel killed nine occupants and injured 24, including 4 firefighters. The building, known as the Fontana Hotel, was originally constructed in 1951. Although the building was officially designated as a hotel, most of its occupants were elderly and used the building as a permanent residence. Of the nine fatalities, the youngest was over 75 years old.

The building was equipped with hard-wired smoke detectors in guest rooms, a fire alarm system with manual stations and corridor smoke detectors, and standpipes. Other fire protection included solid-core 20-minute doors on guest rooms and fire doors separating corridors.

The fire department arrived to find the hotel's lobby fully involved and heavy fire venting from windows the width of the first floor. Heavy smoke and fire were spreading rapidly throughout the hotel. Numerous guests were rescued by firefighters.

The fire destroyed the front portion of the structure, burning through the roof. The remainder of the hotel received smoke and heat damage, although many of the rooms were spared from fire damage.

The building had received several improvements to fire safety features as a result of code enforcement activities of the Miami Beach Fire Department. Ironically, the building was required by State law to install an automatic sprinkler system in 1991.

## SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

| Issues                    | Comments   |
|---------------------------|--|
| Cause of Fire             | Undetermined   |
| The Building              | Three-story hotel, 200 by 90 feet. The building contained 102 guest rooms. Ordinary construction with masonry bearing walls and poured reinforced concrete columns and beams. The floor and roof were made of wood. The Building was served by three stairways and one elevator. |
| Fire Protection Equipment | Building equipped with standpipe system, hard-wired smoke detectors in guest rooms, fire alarm system with manual stations and corridor smoke detectors. Battery detectors also present in some rooms. No sprinklers present.  |
| Delayed Discovery         | Fire is believed to have originated in a concealed space above a first floor storage room. The first indication of a fire occurred when fire dropped through the ceiling of the storage room, igniting mattresses and other materials.   |
| Fatalities                | Nine victims, all over 75 years of age. Several died while evacuating. One victim died in the elevator.  |
| Evacuation                | Over 100 occupants were evacuated. Extreme difficulty in accounting for occupants, though all people were eventually accounted for.  |

## **THE BUILDING**

The Fontana Hotel was originally constructed in 1951 under the Miami Beach Building Code. At the time of construction, the only fire protection features required were a standpipe system and enclosed stairways. The three-story, “L” shaped building was approximately 200 feet by 90 feet.

The building was of ordinary construction with masonry bearing walls and poured reinforced concrete columns and beams. The floors and roof were made of wood. Interior partitions were primarily plaster on metal lath.

The construction of the building created concealed spaces which ran the length of each floor in the space between the floor and ceiling. In addition, there was a major pipe chase which ran from the first floor ceiling to the attic. This pipe chase, which was adjacent to the elevator shaft, was approximately live by ten feet and carried plumbing and other building services (see floor plan, Appendix A). The interior framing of this pipe shaft was exposed wood. The openings on to each floor were not fit-estopped.

This pipe chase and the construction of the floors effectively created a single concealed space that ran the length of the building from the first floor to the attic. A photograph of typical floor construction is included in Appendix E.

Directly adjacent to the Fontana Hotel was a similar structure called the Prince Michael Hotel. The Prince Michael Hotel was virtually a mirror image of the Fontana and at its closest point (the short part of the “L”) was about ten feet away from the Fontana. The building then formed a courtyard with the Fontana that was occupied by an outdoor swimming pool and an outdoor seating area.

## **FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES**

A number of fire protection improvements were made in the building. Battery operated smoke detectors were ordered to be installed in each guest room in January 1986. In 1987, solid-core doors with self closet-s were installed in each guest room. Hard-wired smoke detectors were installed in October of 1989. Emergency lighting was provided in each stairwell. Fire doors were located in the long corridor on each floor.

A manual fire alarm system was upgraded to include corridor smoke detection. The building fire alarm was also equipped to shut down the air handling system.

## **THE FIRE DEPARTMENT**

The Miami Beach Fire Department operates four engines, two ladders, and six rescue (advanced life support EMS) units from four stations. They operate with a minimum of four personnel per company. They protect a resident population of about 98,000. Of 234 personnel, about 200 are uniformed firefighters. Basic Life Support EMS is provided by a private ambulance company.

## **THE FIRE**

There were several people in the lobby of the building during the period before the fire. The night manager and several others in the lobby reported smelling smoke shortly after 0300 hours. Upon investigating, the top of a mattress piled in the storeroom off the lobby was discovered to be on fire. At this point, the occupants reportedly split up: one got a bucket of water to extinguish the fire, another returned to the front desk to call the fire department. The fire department received the call at 0308. Conditions within the lobby deteriorated rapidly. Within three minutes, the entire lobby was involved in fire. The occupants of the lobby evacuated and returned via the side door and began to knock on doors to awaken guests.

At 0311 units on scene reported fire venting from the entire lobby. Several cars parked in the driveway of the hotel were also on fire. Building occupants were evacuating by the stairwells.

## **INCIDENT COMMAND/INVESTIGATION**

A chief officer arrived simultaneously with the first engine company and rescue unit and implemented the incident command system. A Command Post was established at the front of the building. Emphasis was placed on setting up rescue, medical and transport sections, while making an attack on the fire. A triage area was established in the street to the east of the Fontana Hotel.

A second alarm, consisting of one engine, one ladder and two rescue units was called for immediately upon arrival. A triage area was established in the street in front of the Prince Michael Hotel to the south



of the Fontana Hotel. The first arriving ladder captain was assigned the rear sector and ordered to conduct a search for occupants.

A third alarm (mutual aid) was called for within seven minutes after arrival, consisting of three engines, on ladder and a chief officer. Section assignments were made and the fire was attacked from all sides with emphasis placed on protecting the Prince Michael Hotel. A ladder pipe was placed in service to protect the front portion of the Prince Michael Hotel.

One hundred seven firefighters, 10 engines, four ladders, and 10 ambulances were involved in the incident. Mutual aid was provided by the City of Miami and Metropolitan Dade County Fire Rescue.

Firefighters were able to extinguish the bulk of the fire in the lobby and were actively attacking fire in the ceiling area around the shaft when portions of the second floor began collapsing into the lobby. During this period, firefighters in the main wing of the building were able to maintain access to the corridors. Despite heavy heat and smoke conditions, access was made to most guest rooms in the Hotel. Many occupants were evacuated from the structure during the fire.

Attack on the fire was finally changed to a defensive mode due to deteriorating conditions within the structure. The fire had made significant headway in concealed spaces and the attic before it was discovered. The second floor had collapsed into the lobby about an hour into the blaze. The fire extended into the attic and burned the length of the building over the next several hours. Fire dropped from the attic into the third floor as it consumed the roof. The fire burned about four and one-half hours before being brought under control. Ultimately, much of the roof was destroyed as fire spread through the attic space. The front section of the building was basically gutted, with the fire burning through the room and causing collapse of the upper floors into the lobby area. (See Appendix A.)

One of the first concerns was to develop a list of those in the hotel. Unfortunately, the official guest list was destroyed in the fire, so a new list was constructed using the recollections of those occupants who had evacuated or had been rescued from the building. Residents of the Hotel were transported to a community center, where they were asked to recall the room numbers and location of other hotel occupants. The media were

alerted and broadcast several appeals to the public to call a special number at the Miami Beach Fire Department if they had any information concerning the whereabouts of any resident of the hotel. Despite these efforts, there were still 21 people unaccounted for after two days. Eventually, through calls to the M.B.F.D. and investigation, the list of the missing was reduced to nine.

Identification and recovery of the bodies of the people who died in the fire was difficult because of the extensive damage and structural collapse. Three fatalities were removed in the course of fire operations. The rest were recovered after the fire was extinguished. Other agencies assisting the Miami Beach Fire Department investigators included the Florida State Fire Marshal's Office, the Dade County Medical Examiner, the Metropolitan Dade County Fire Department, the Miami Beach Police Department and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.

Approximately 100 investigators were involved with the fire in some way (cause and origin, interviewing witnesses, etc.). Progress in the investigation was slow as layer after layer of material had to be removed to expose bodies and evidence related to the determination of the fire's cause.

Dog teams were also brought in to help locate victims in the building. The remains of the last fatality were removed five days after the fire.

Local elected officials were notified during the fire and were on hand to approve acquisition of heavy equipment needed for the search of the building and investigation. It is estimated that the scene investigation, recovery of bodies, and related items cost the City over \$50,000.

The cause of the fire remains undetermined. Investigators were able to determine the point of origin to be in the ceiling space of the storage room off the lobby. No defects in the building's electrical system were found, nor were any accelerants detected. Other causes ruled out included boilers and vending machines.

## **FIRE DEVELOPMENT**

The fire originated in the concealed space above the storage room adjacent to the lobby. It is likely that combustion products spread upward through the pipe chase and "mushroomed" in the attic before the fire developed to such a point that the ceiling in the storage room failed and began falling in. The failure of the ceiling in the storage room provided the fire with a supply of oxygen, which intensified the fire throughout the

building. The rapid fire development in the lobby area is consistent with the extensive fire growth in the concealed spaces in the first floor ceiling, which undoubtedly began to affect the structural integrity of the second floor above the lobby.

According to building occupants, the fire in the storage room was the first indication of a problem in the building. Residents of the hotel returning as little as 20 minutes before the fire was discovered traveled through the lobby, rode the elevator (adjacent to the pipe chase), and exited on upper floors without noticing any indication of fire or smoke.

Once the lobby area became involved in fire, smoke spread rapidly throughout the structure. Hotel staff alerting occupants and assisting them out of the building reported that the upper floors became obscured with smoke within minutes of the fire's discovery. Several occupants who were able to escape reported that smoke detectors were sounding throughout the building. Firefighters entering the building encountered heavy smoke and heat conditions during search operations.

It is not believed that the air handling system played a significant role in the spread of the fire or smoke.

The stairways remained tenable throughout the fire. The front stairway, however, was contaminated above the second floor when one victim was overcome while attempting to exit. The victim's body blocked the stairway door in the open position.

Single station hard-wired smoke detectors in guest rooms did activate. There were conflicting statements as to whether the building fire alarm was activated. The control wiring for the alarm ran through the concealed space where the fire originated, leading some to believe that by the time a manual station was pulled, the fire alarm wiring was destroyed. The fire alarm control panel was located in an office behind the front desk and remained basically intact throughout the fire. (See photograph, Appendix E.) The fact that corridor smoke detectors did not activate was consistent with the development of fire.

When the Hotel installed hard-wired detectors in guest rooms, they left the battery-operated detectors in place. Many of these battery-operated units functioned during the fire. (The presence of these battery-operated units, some of which were in disrepair, led to some inaccurate media reports that there were no working smoke detectors in the guest rooms).

## OCCUPANT BEHAVIOR

The Miami Beach Fire Department estimates that there were about 140 people in the Fontana Hotel on the morning of the fire. Most occupants were asleep when the fire was discovered. Of the nine fatalities, several were overcome while attempting to exit the structure. A complete listing of victims with ages and room of residence is included in Appendix B. A floor plan showing the room of residence and position of fatalities when recovered is included as Appendix C.

One fatality, whose room was located across the hall from an exit, was discovered fully dressed, with coat and shoes, and had a purse containing valuables. Apparently, she took time to get dressed and collect valuables before leaving. She was found on the floor of her room carrying a flashlight, which was still on when she was removed. Her delay to gather belongings cost her her life. A photograph of her room (205) showing its closeness to the exit is included in Appendix E.

It is believed that most of the victims found in the lobby were originally on upper floors. Their bodies were recovered amid the burned debris from the collapse of the second and third floors in the lobby area. It is not clear whether they had attempted to evacuate before they were overcome.

One victim was killed when she attempted to exit the third floor by using the elevator. The elevator stalled on the first floor and she was overcome.

## LESSONS LEARNED

1. Vigorous enforcement of the fire code pays off.

Although there was considerable life loss in this fire, the code provisions incorporated in the building over the years undoubtedly played a role in reducing the loss of life. The Miami Beach Fire Department took the previous owners of the building to court over installation of fire protection equipment. They should be applauded for their continued emphasis on code enforcement.

2. Sprinklers are needed in old structures.

Florida law required that all hotels be equipped with sprinklers by October 1, 1991. That legislation was in danger of expiring when this fire occurred. Although it was retained as a law in Florida, October 1991 was too late for the victims of this fire. (A copy of the Florida Law is included in Appendix D.)

3. Provisions should be made to provide adequate communications for mutual aid companies.

Because of differing radio frequencies, there was difficulty communicating with mutual aid companies operating on this incident. While this did not cause considerable problems, there were some difficulties in coordinating the use of master streams late in the incident. Arrangements such as maintaining a supply of extra portable radios should be made to anticipate situations such as this.

4. Combustible concealed spaces deserve protection.

This fire demonstrates the potential for loss when a fire originates in an area that is not provided with detection or suppression systems. When the fire reached a stage when it would activate the smoke detectors, it had grown to such a degree that the occupants had little time to escape. Additionally, the wiring for the fire alarm was compromised by the fire so that even manual activation of the alarm was not possible.

Providing combustible concealed spaces with detection or suppression systems can prevent these types of fires from spreading before being detected.

5. Evacuation drills should be encouraged even when they are not required.


A residential hotel such as the Fontana has a relatively stable population of residents so periodic fire drills can be an effective way to educate them on what actions to take in an emergency both to best protect themselves and to cooperate with an organized evacuation effort should the need arise. Injuries and possibility even fatalities might have been prevented in this fire if residents had received such training. Also, the extensive efforts and staff time on the part of the fire department required to account for evacuees could have been saved.

## **Appendices**

- A. Fontana Hotel Floor Plans Showing Extent of Structural Collapse
- B. Fontana Hotel Fire Victims
- C. Enlarged Floor Plans Showing Room of Residence and Final Position of Victims
- D. Florida Statute on Sprinklers in Hotels
- E. Photographs

**Appendix A**


**Fontana Hotel Floor Plans  
Showing Extent of Structural Collapse**



LOBBY FLOOR PLAN - FONTANA HOTEL, MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA


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SECOND LEVEL FLOOR PLAN - FONTANA HOTEL, MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA

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THIRD LEVEL FLOOR PLAN - FONTANA HOTEL, MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA

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R11-11-91



## Appendix B

### Fontana Hotel Fire Victims

|    | <u>Name</u>                         | <u>Age</u> | <u>Room Victim<br/>Lived In</u> |
|----|-------------------------------------|------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. | Sally Mur                           | 75 years   | 340                             |
| 2. | Doris Fein<br>aka Dorothy Trapanese | 81         | 439                             |
| 3. | Selma Rauthaus                      | 85         | 339                             |
| 4. | Sara Pollack                        | 87         | 432                             |
| 5. | Martha Springer                     | 88         | 205                             |
| 6. | Nettie Feingold                     | 89         | 332                             |
|    | Jack Schwarz                        | 92         | 330                             |
| 8. | Dr. Joseph Wels                     | 92         | 227                             |
| 9. | Minnie Weinstein                    | 93         | 433                             |

**Appendix C**

**Enlarged Floor Plans Showing Room of  
Residence and Final Position of Victims**



**Appendix D**

**Florida Statute on Sprinklers in Hotels**

Restaurants shall impose administrative sanctions pursuant to s. 509.261.

*History.*—s. 1, Ch. 90-242.

**509.213 Emergency first aid to choking victims.—**

[The expiration of this section pursuant to s. 5, ch. 83-241, was nullified by s. 51, ch. 90-339. Repealed effective October 1, 2000, by s. 52, ch. 90-339, and scheduled for review pursuant to s. 11.61.]

**<sup>1</sup>509.214 Notification of automatic gratuity charge.**

Every public food service establishment which includes an automatic gratuity or service charge in the price of the meal shall include on the food menu and on the face of the bill provided to the customer notice that an automatic gratuity is included.

*History.*—s. 1, ch. 86-24; s. 1, ch. 88-16, ss. 21, 52, ch. 90-339

<sup>1</sup>Note.—Repealed effective October 1, 2000, by s. 52, ch. 90-339, and scheduled for review pursuant to s. 11.61.

**<sup>1</sup>509.215 Firesafety.—**

(1) Any:

(a) Public lodging establishment, as defined in this chapter, which is of three stories or more and for which the construction contract has been let after September 30, 1983, with interior corridors which do not have direct access from the guest area to exterior means of egress, or

(b) Building over 75 feet in height that has direct access from the guest area to exterior means of egress and for which the construction contract has been let after September 30, 1983,

shall be equipped with an automatic sprinkler system installed in compliance with the provisions prescribed in the National Fire Protection Association publication NFPA No. 13 (1985), "Standards for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems." The sprinkler installation may be omitted in closets which are not over 24 square feet in area and in bathrooms which are not over 55 square feet in area, which closets and bathrooms are located in guest rooms. Each guest room shall be equipped with an approved listed single-station smoke detector meeting the minimum requirements of NFPA-74 (1964) "Standards for the Installation, Maintenance and Use of Household Fire Warning Equipment." powered from the building electrical service, notwithstanding the number of stories in the structure. If the contract for construction is let after September 30, 1983. Single-station smoke, detection is not required when guest rooms contain smoke detectors connected to a central alarm system which also alarms locally.

(2) Any public lodging establishment, as defined in this chapter, which is of three stories or more and for which the construction contract was let before October 1, 1983, shall be equipped with:

(a) A system which complies with subsection (1); or

(b) An approved sprinkler system for all interior corridors, public areas, storage rooms, closets, kitchen areas, and laundry rooms, less individual guest rooms, if the following conditions are met:

1. There is a minimum 1-hour separation between each guest room and between each guest room and a corridor.

2. The building is constructed of noncombustible materials.

3. The egress conditions meet the requirements of s. 5-3 of the Life Safety Code, NFPA 101 (1985).

4. The building has a complete automatic fire detection system which meets the requirements of NFPA-72A (1987) and NFPA-72E (1984), including smoke detectors in each guest room individually annunciating to a panel at a supervised location.

(3) The Division of State Fire Marshal may prescribe uniform standards for firesafety equipment for public lodging establishments for which the construction contracts were let before October 1, 1983. An entire building shall be equipped as outlined not later than October 1, 1989, except that the approved sprinkler system may be delayed by the Division of State Fire Marshal until October 1, 1991, on a schedule for complete compliance in accordance with rules to be adopted by the Division of State Fire Marshal, which schedule shall include's provision for a 1-year extension which may be granted not more than three times for any individual requesting an extension. The entire system must be installed and operational by October 1, 1994. The Division of State Fire Marshal shall not grant an extension for the approved sprinkler system unless a written request for the extension and a construction work schedule is submitted. The Division of State Fire Marshal may grant an extension upon demonstration that compliance with this section by the date required would impose an extreme hardship and a disproportionate financial impact. Any establishment that has been granted an extension by the Division of State Fire Marshal shall post, in a conspicuous place on the premises, a public notice stating that the establishment has not yet installed the approved sprinkler system required by law.

(4) The provisions for installation of single-station smoke detectors required in subsection (1) and sub. paragraph (2)(b)4. shall be waived by the Division of State Fire Marshal for any establishment for which the construction contract was let before October 1, 1983, and which is under three stories in height, if each individual guest room is equipped with a smoke detector approved by the Division of State Fire Marshal and the schedule for compliance is not later than October 1, 1986.

(5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, this section applies only to those public lodging establishments in a building wherein more than 50 percent of the units in the building are advertised or held out to the public as available for transient occupancy.

(6) Special exception to the provisions of this section shall be made for hotel structures that are on the National Register of Historic Places as determined by the United States Department of the Interior or that are of historical significance to this state as determined by the State Historic Preservation Officer, designated pursuant to s. 267.061(5), after consultation with the chairperson of the local historic preservation board or commission, if such board or commission exists. For such structures, provisions shall be made for a system of fire protection and life safety support that would meet the intent of the NFPA standards and be acceptable to, and approved by, a commission composed of the director of

the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, the director of the Division of State Fire Marshal, and the State Historic Preservation Officer. The director of the Division of State Fire Marshal shall be designated chairperson of the commission and shall record the minutes of each commission meeting.

(7) The Division of State Fire Marshal shall adopt, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 120, any rules necessary for the implementation and enforcement of this section. The Division of State Fire Marshal shall enforce this section in accordance with the provisions of chapter 633, and any establishment licensed under this chapter in violation of this section may be subject to administrative sanctions by the division pursuant to s.509.261.

(8) Specialized smoke detectors for the deaf and guests in public lodging establishments at a rate of at least such smoke detector per 50 dwelling units or portions thereof, not to exceed five such smoke detectors per public lodging facility.

**History.** ss 1-3, 4, ch 83-194, s 91, ch 85-81, s 7, ch 86-174, s 32, ch 88-243, s 22, 51, 52, ch 90-339.

**Note.** Repealed effective October 1, 2000 by s 52, ch 90-339, and scheduled for review pursuant to s 11 61.

#### **1509.221 Sanitary regulations.—**

(1) Each public lodging establishment and each public food service establishment shall be supplied with potable water and shall provide adequate sanitary facilities for the accommodation of its employees and guests. Such facilities may include, but are not limited to showers, handwash basins, toilets, and bidets. Such sanitary facilities shall be connected to approved plumbing. Such plumbing shall be sized, installed, and maintained in accordance with applicable state and local plumbing codes. Wastewater or sewage shall be properly treated onsite or discharged into an approved sewage collection and treatment system.

(2) Each public lodging establishment and each public food service establishment shall maintain not less than one public bathroom for each sex, properly designated. Each transiently rented public lodging establishment that does not provide private or connecting bathrooms shall maintain one public bathroom on each floor for every 15 guests, or major fraction of that number, rooming on that floor.

(3) Each establishment licensed under this chapter shall be properly lighted, heated, cooled, and ventilated and shall be operated with strict regard to the health, comfort, and safety of the guests. Such proper lighting shall be construed to apply to both daylight and artificial illumination.

(4) Each bedroom in a public lodging establishment shall have an opening to the outside of the building, air shafts, or courts sufficient to provide adequate ventilation. Where ventilation is provided mechanically, the system shall be capable of providing at least two air changes per hour in all areas served. Where ventilation is provided by windows, each room shall have at least one window opening directly to the outside.

(5) Each public lodging establishment renting transiently and each public food service establishment shall provide in the main public bathroom soap and clean tow-

els or other approved hand-drying devices and each public lodging establishment shall furnish each guest with two clean individual towels so that two guests will not be required to use the same towel unless it has first been laundered.

(6) Each public lodging establishment renting transiently shall provide each bed, bunk, cot, or other sleeping place for the use of guests with clean pillowslips and under and top sheets. Sheets and pillowslips shall be laundered before they are used by another guest, a clean set being furnished each succeeding guest. All bedding, including mattresses, quilts, blankets, pillows, sheets, and comforters, shall be thoroughly aired, disinfected, and kept clean. Bedding, including mattresses, quilts, blankets, pillows, sheets, or comforters, may not be used if they are worn out or unfit for further use.

(7) The operator of any establishment licensed under this chapter shall take effective measures to protect the establishment against the entrance and the breeding on the premises of all vermin. Any room in such establishment infested with such vermin shall be fumigated, disinfected, renovated, or other corrective action taken until the vermin are exterminated.

(8) A person, while suffering from any contagious or communicable disease, while a carrier of such disease, or while afflicted with boils or infected wounds or sores, may not be employed by any establishment licensed under this chapter. In any capacity whereby there is a likelihood such disease could be transmitted to other individuals. An operator that has reason to believe that an employee may present a public health risk shall immediately notify the proper health authority.

(9) Subsections (2), (5), and (6) do not apply to any facility or unit classified as a resort condominium as described in s. 509.242(1)(c).

**History.** ss 12, 16, 24, 26, 32, ch 69-52, ss 1, 5, ch 69-53, 1915, RGS 2112, 2136, 2144, 2146, 2152, 2156, 56-12, ss 5, 6, 10, ch 90-64, 1923, ss 3, 4, ch 121-63, 1927, CGL 3361, 3365, 3373, 3375, 3381, 3385, 7836, ss 14, 18, 26, 28, 34, 37, ch 100-42, 1933, CGL 1936 Supp. 3361-3365, 3373-3375, 3381, 3382, 3384, 3385, s 8, ch 57-369, s 1, ch 59-152, ss 16, 35, ch 69-106, s 3, ch 71-157, s 18, ch 73-325, s 3, ch 76-168, s 1, ch 77-174, s 1, ch 77-457, ss 17, 39, 42, ch 79-240, ss 3, 4, ch 81-161, s 388, ch 81-259, ss 2, 3, ch 81-318, ss 3, 4, ch 82-84, ss 3, 4, ch 83-241, ss 23, 51, 52, ch 90-339.

**Note.** Repealed effective October 1, 2000 by s 52, ch 90-339, and scheduled for review pursuant to s 11 61.

**Note.** Former ss 511 13-511 17, 511 25-511 27, 511 35-511 37, 511 42.

#### **1509.232 School carnivals and fairs; exemption from certain food service regulations.—**

Any public or non-profit school which operates a carnival, fair, or other celebration, by whatever name known, which is in operation for 3 days or less and which includes the sale and preparation of food and beverages must notify the local county health unit of the proposed event and is exempt from any temporary food service regulations with respect to the requirements for having hot and cold running water; floors which are constructed of tight wood, asphalt, concrete, or other cleanable material; enclosed walls and ceilings with screening; and certain size counter service. A school may not use this notification process to circumvent the license requirements of this chapter.

**History.**—s. Ch 81-147, ss 24, 52, ch 90-339.

**Note.** Repealed effective October 1, 2000 by s 52, ch 90-339 and Scheduled for review pursuant to s 11 61.



(2) Trouble signals shall be audible and distinctive from alarm signals, and shall comply with NFPA 72-A 2-7.3.

(3) The annunciator system shall have primary power supplied in accordance with NFPA 72-A 2-6.3 and 2-6.7, and secondary power supplied in accordance with NFPA 72-A 2-6.4.

4A-43.011 Extinguishment Requirements - Automatic Fire Sprinklers.  
Specific Authority 509.215(7), 633.05, 633.051, F.S. Law Implemented 509.215, 633.01, 633.081, F.S. History - New 11-12-85, Formerly 4A-43.10, Repealed \_\_\_\_\_.

4A-43.012 Standpipe and Hose Systems. Standpipe and hose systems are required for all transient public lodging establishments which are located in buildings exceeding 50 feet in height or in building over six stories high which have a complete automatic sprinkler system. The standpipe and hose systems shall comply with the provisions of NFPA 14, as adopted in Rule Chapter 4A-3.012, Florida Administrative Code.  
Specific Authority 509.215(7), 633.01, F.S. Law Implemented 509.215, 633.022, F.S. History - New 11-12-85, Formerly 4A-43.11, Amended 8-24-87, \_\_\_\_\_.

4A-43.013 Places of Assembly.  
Specific Authority 509.215(7), 633.05, 633.051, F.S. Law Implemented 509.215(7), 633.01, F.S. History - New 11-12-85, Formerly 4A-43.12, Repealed \_\_\_\_\_.

4A-43.014 Fire Safety Standards for Other Buildings, Equipment or Devices.  
Specific Authority 509.215(7), 633.05, 633.051, F.S. Law Implemented 509.215(7), 633.01, F.S. History - New 11-12-85, Formerly 4A-43.13, Repealed \_\_\_\_\_.

#### 4A-43.015 Special Compliance Schedule.

(1) Individuals failing to comply with the October 1, 1989, deadline for sprinklers as stipulated by Section 509.215, and 721.24, Florida Statutes, may be granted an extension of time upon compliance with the following requirements:

(a) The individual shall submit a letter of notification of intent to request an extension to the State Fire Marshal. This letter shall be received in the Office of the State Fire Marshal in Tallahassee no later than 5:00 P.M. on October 1, 1990, and

(b) The individual shall submit an engineering design plan which is in compliance with Chapter 471, Florida Statutes, together with a construction schedule to the State Fire Marshal. The engineering design plan and the construction schedule together with evidence demonstrating that compliance with this section by the date required would impose an extreme hardship and a disproportionate financial impact shall be received in the Office of the State Fire Marshal in Tallahassee no later than 5:30 P.M. on January 1, 1991.

## **Appendix E**

### **Photographs**

Slides and photographs are included with the master report at the United States Fire Administration. Selected photos are presented on the following pages. They are by the author or were provided by the Miami Beach Fire Department (MBFD) as noted.



*(MBFD photo)*

Lobby of the Prince Michael Hotel, interior finish and construction is similar to that of the Fontana.



Exterior attack in progress, note fire involvement of attic.

*(MBFD photo)*



Front of hotel.

*(MBFD photo)*



Aerial view of Hotel after the fire. Note destruction of the roof and proximity of the Prince Michael Hotel. *(MBFD photo)*



Front of hotel, lobby desk is located to far right along wall.



Front of hotel, looking toward the Prince Michael Hotel.






Lobby, looking up through roof facing Collins Street.



First floor corridor, looking to rear of building from lobby. Fire door in foreground was closed throughout much of the fire.



Typical floor construction, shown from ceiling of first floor room.



Lobby, looking up pipe chase located adjacent to elevator shaft.

Best available image



Outline of victim in smoke stain, Room 205. Victim was reportedly found carrying a flashlight (still on) and personal belongings in a purse.



View of Room 205, fire exit is visible across corridor.





Second floor, looking across to Room 301 from front stairway, area of origin is at base of photo.




View from second floor, front stairway looking straight across building. Lobby is at bottom of photo.





Manual tire alarm station and bell, third floor, at rear stair. Note extensive darkening soot.



Remains of fire alarm control panel.